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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF u·TAH

DALE ,V. CORBRIDGE and
DORLENE CORBRIDGE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.
10853

l\I. nIORRIN & SONS, INC., a Cor-

poration,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover for personal injury
sustained by the plaintiff Dorlene Corbridge, as a result
of a fall into a deep excavation made and maintained
by the defendant, a road construction contractor.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After the complaint and answer had been fil d
e and
the case was set for pre-trial hearing the def d
'
en ant
moved for, a summary
judgment.
The
Court
.
granted
defendants motion for summary judgment and th
plaintiff has appealed.
e
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs ask that the judgment of the Lower
Court be reversed and the case remanded for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 31st day of August, 1965, at approximately
10:30 p.m., the plaintiff, Dorlene Corbridge, was driv·
ing an automobile owned by her husband in a northerly
direction on Highway #89, toward Ogden, Utah. She
was returning with her children from a recreational outing at the Lagoon Amusement Park in Davis County,
At this time the defendant was involved in construction of the new highway between Ogden and Hill
Field Road, and also making certain repairs upon said
highway. The defendant had dug a large excavation
(approximately 15 feet deep) across the existing
highway at the mouth of Weber Canyon. The
purpose of the excavation was to install a cement
culvert to carry the water in a presently existing
canal from the east side of the highway underneath
the highway to the west. The defendant had in·
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stalled detour signs 2 or 3 hundred yards north and
o:outh of the excavation itself to route the traffic around
the excavation and to the west of the presently existing
higlnvay, but there were no barriers, barricades or warning <levices in the immediate vicinity of the excavation
itself.
Immediately to the east of the excavation site was
i large sand and gravel pit and immediately to the
, 1 est of the existing highway was another large sand
and gravel pit owned and operated by a different company. Since the excavation took place at this particular
location, the detour road was relatively narrow and only
all<n,-ed one lane of traffic in each direction over a dirt
road.
As the plaintiff proceeded in a northerly direction
and before reaching the construction area, her automobile ceased to operate and she coasted down the
hill from the Hill Field Road. Her car was moving
very slowly as she approached the construction site.
She coasted her automobile just to the north of the
detour sign on the south end of the construction, pulled
her car off the road and stopped. (Dep. p. 8). At the
time she stopped her car she observed nothing else in
the area because it was a very dark night. (Dep. p. 8).
She alighted from her car and a passing motorist offered her a ride. She returned to her automobile to
instruct the children to remain in the car, keep the
windmvs rolled up and the automobile locked until
she returned. She was going to get a ride near Ogden
and seek assistance to help her start the automobile.
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While she was . giving the said instructions to he r ch'J .
1
dren, the traffic was heavy on the detour port'ion ,
01
the road and the lady who stopped to render assist
ancr
was farced to move on the north to the other side .
.
m
t he excavation because she was "afraid she would (fet
hit" by the north-bound vehicles. (Dep. 8-9). Th~re
was not room on the detour road for the traffic to gii
around her.
The plaintiff had observed the actions of her bene.
factor and saw the car pull around to the other side
of the detour road. At that time she could see the tail
lights of the automobile and she proceeded to walk
directly toward the lights. (Dep. p. 9). She could not
estimate the distance she' had walked because it was
dark and she saw nothing in the direction that she was
walking except the tail lights of the other automobile.
She felt nothing unusual under her feet although she
could not see the ground because it was extremely
dark and the excavation and construction site was
unlighted. As she proceeded in a northerly direction
she fell into the open excavation made by the defendant
and impaled her body upon the reinforcement concrete
steel rods that protruded from the partially completed
canal and received serious and permanent injury as
a result of the fall. A short while later other motorists
saw the disabled automobile, stopped to render assist·
ance and heard the plaintiff moaning at the bottom
of the excavation. They then secured a flashlight, found
the injured plaintiff, summoned aid and she was trans·
ported to the hospital in Ogden.
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Prior to the time the plaintiff fell into the excavation, she saw no lumber, concrete forms or other debris
that would indicate the presence of an excavation (Dep.
P· 12) and was completely unaware of the excavation.
The plaintiff was not really familiar with the area
in which the construction was taking place. She had
driYm pa.st the area from a different direction earlier
thnt day on her way to the outing at Lagoon, but had
not Leen on the route for 6 months prior to the date
11 f the accident. On the night of the accident, the weather
·,1·as windy, cold, and very dark near the construction
site. (Dep. p. 6).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A DRASTIC
REMEDY AND SHOULD BE GRANTED
ONLY WHEN UNDER THE FACTS VIEWED
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF
SHE SHOULD NOT RECOVER AS A MATTER O:F LAW.

In Auto Lease Company v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 264, the Utah
Supreme Court said at page 265,
"The Motion for Summary Judgment is, in
effect, a demurrer to the contentions of the adverse party, saying : 'Conceding the facts to be as
you claim, there is no basis for recovery'."
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The position of the Utah court is also very 1
c earh·
spelled out in Welchman v. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25 , ~
.
, 33,
P .2 d 410, decided by the Utah Supreme Court in .
19 n9
t he court sa1.d at page 411,
'
"Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and
the courts shoul~ be reluctant to deprive litigants
o~ an opportu~1ty to fully present their conten.
hons upon a trial. It should be granted only whe
under the facts viewed in the light most favorabi°
to the plaintiff he could not recover as a matte~
of law."
The burden of the defendant asking summarr
judgment in this kind of situation is great and th~t
burden is clearly defined in Baker v. Decker ,117 Utah
15, 212 P.2d 679, decided by the Utah Supreme Court
in 1949 where the court said at page 682,
"We must keep in mind that the burden is
upon the defendant to establish this claim anu
that unless all reasonable minds must conclude
that Mrs. Baker was negligent in the manner in
which she attempted to get over the canvas the
question of her due care must be submitted to
the jury for determination .... Ordinary, reason·
able persons will trip over objects, stumble over
obstructions, slip on slick surfaces and fall into
holes or excavations. Even though they may see
the object they sometimes fail to comprehend ana
anticipate the incident which precipitates the in·
jury. Usually whether a reasonable person wouU
have properly appraised the situation mul
escaped injury is for a jury to determine." (Em·
phasis added)
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Based upon the deposition and affidavit of the
plaintiff, Dorlene Corbridge,. it appears clear that she
was not aware of the excavation. She was faced with an
emergency because her car had failed to operate, she
had her children with her, she was worried about the
safety of her children as she sought assistance. When
her benefactor stopped to render her aid she stopped
:wJmentarily in the detour road but observing the heavy
traffic and recognizing the danger of remaining there
sbe told the plaintiff, "I am going to pull up around
:.iways because I am afraid I will get hit here." (Dep.
p. 9 :. , The plaintiff did not see any lights, signs, signals
or bnrricades around the excavation or any warning
whatever that an excavation was in fact present. (Aff.
p. J .i Plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she was afraid
to walk into the detoured area of the road because the
traffic was heavy and she too was afraid she would be hit
and since she could see her benefactor's tail lights she
walked directly toward the tail lights when she fell into
the excavation. (Aff, p. 2)
The sole question involving plaintiff's conduct is
whether a reasonable person would have properly appraised the situation and thereby escaped the injury.
Considering the nature of her circumstance, the emergency, the lack of light, lack of knowledge that the
excavation was present and posing the danger for her,
it cannot be said that all reasonable minds would conclude that she failed to act in a reasonable manner.
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POINT II
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A SUBSTITUTE
FOR ATRIAL.
Plaintiffs readily concede that the summary jud .
ment procedure is a valuable device to pierce the alleg!.
tions of the pleading and if there is in fact no genuine
issue as to material fact the delay and expense of litigation should and ought to be avoided. However, Justice Callister made clear the purpose of Rule 56, in
Dupler v. Yates, IO Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624 where
the court said at page 636,
"Rule 56 U.R.C.P. is not intended to provide
a substitute for the regular trial of cases in which
there are disputed issues of fact upon which the
outcome of the litigation depends. And it should
be invoked with caution to the end that litigants
may be afforded a trial where there exists between them a bona fide dispute of material fact."
The court reaffirmed that philosophy in Tanner v.
Utah Poultry and Farrners Cooperative, 11 Utah 2d
353, 359 P.2d 18 at page 19, where the court said,
"A summary judgment is appropriate only
where the favored party makes a showing which
precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of
any relief to the losing party."
The court should consider the facts of this case
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Dorlene Cor·
bridge as Justice Crockett pointed out in Morris v.
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Farnsworth Motel, et al., 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297,

where the court said at page 298,

"Under such circumstances, the party against
·whom the summary judgment is granted, is
entitled to the benefit of having the court consider all of the facts presented, and every inference fairly arising therefrom in the light most
favorable to him."
If we view the facts most favorable to the plaintiff
Dorlene Corbridge, we must necessarily conclude that
it was very dark outside, that she was completely un;nvare of the excavation, that she was faced with an
.~mergency that required her to either walk through the
construction area or walk upon the detour road that
was heavily traveled at that time and upon which she
had already concluded it was unsafe to walk. We must
also conclude that the defendant had failed to place a
barricade or any kind of a device arouad the excavation
to prevent persons from falling into it, or to light it
or place any kind of warning device upon it to give
notice to anyone who may be in that area and inclined
to fall into the excavation.

The defendant has moved for summary judgment
upon the grounds that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent in that she was walking in a known construction area when it was so dark she could see no objects
around her; further, claiming that she assumed the risk
when she went into the area marked off by the detour
signs and a barricade.
The proposition that the question of contributory
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negligence is for the jury to determine is funda
mental
and does not deserve a great deal of attention I
iere
See Moore v. Miles, 108 Utah 167, 158 P.2d 676 . ·
which the court held,
' lJl
"I~ this jurisdiction. we are committed to the
doctrine that the question of contributorv ne 1.
.
f
h .
J
gi.
gence is one or t e Jury, where as said in Carpenter v. Syrett, 99 Utah 208, 104 P.2d 6l"
. 619, 'different conclusions may be reasonabl~
drawn by different minds from the same evj.
dence'."

POINT III
MERE KNOWLEDGE OF A DANGER
OUS CONDITION IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO
DEFEAT RECOVERY.
Even if we assume that the plaintiff, Dorlene Cor·
bridge, was aware of the construction there is no evi- '
dence that she was aware of the excavation and she was
clearly not aware of the extent of the danger at the
time of her injury. A recent pertinent case in Utah
is Baker v. Decker, 117 Utah 15, 212 P.2d 679, decided
by our court in 1949, where the court said at page 682,
citing a prior Utah decision,

"It is well settled that mere knowledge that a
walk is dangerous, unsafe for travel, is not suffi·
cient to establish contributory negligence though
there is another way that is safe and convenient,
and to defeat recovery, it must appear that the
traveler knew or as an ordinary cautious person
should have known that it was imprudent to use
the walk."
10

In the Baker case, a 71-year-old woman tripped
on a canvas spread over the floor of the hallway of her
apartment house by painters who were painting, paper-.
ing and cleaning the hallway. And the court found that
ev~n a person of advanced years with limited eyesight
and judgment was not contributorily negligent as a
matter of law in using the somewhat dangerous passageway.

Further conceding that even if the plaintiff were
aware of the dangerous condition of the roadway prior
to the time of her injury, her forgetfulness of the danger
does not amount to contributory negligence. See Bicklwrri vs. Southern California Edison, 263 P.2d 32 decided by the Court of Appeals in the Second District of
California in 1953 held:
"To forget is not negligence, unless it shows
the want of ordinary care, and it is a question
for the jury. It is settled beyond question that
if one has knowledge of the existence of a dangerous condition momentary forgetfulness of the
danger does not amount to contributory negligence if there is reason to believe that he nevertheless acted with ordinary prudence and caution."
The California Courts affirmed this position in

Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Company, et al.,
282 P. 2d 69 ( 1955) . The court said at page 74,
"Momentary forgetfulness may be in accord
with the conduct of a reasonably prudent man."
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POINT IV
DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
REQUIRES THAT THE PLAINTIFF KNEW
OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION AND
VOLUNTARILY SUBJECTED HERSELF TO
THE RISK.
The plaintiff, Dorlene Corbridge, lacked sufficient
knowledge of the hazardous condition to have assumed
the risk of her injury. In Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah
177, 239 P.2d 1075, the Utah Court said at page 1076,
"The defense of assumption of risk as a legal .
concept requires that the plaintiff must ban
looked, must have seen and must have known o!
a danger, voluntarily subjecting himself thereto
and consenting that if injury result, he who mav
have negligently exposed him thereto, should b'e
relieved of any liability therefor .... 'Assump·
tion of risk must be free and voluntary'."
Justice Wolfe, in a concurring opinion very care·
fully drew the distinction between assumption of risk
and contributory negligence, where he said at page 1077,
"But the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria .
(assumed risk) stands outs~d~ the def e~se. of
contributory negligence and is m no way luruted
by it. In individual instances the two ideas some·
times seem to cover the same ground, but care·
lessness is not the same thing as intelligent
choice."
The court also said at page 1076,
"The essential elements of assumed ris~ a:e
knowledge, actual or implied, by the plamtiff
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of a specific defect or dangerous condition caused

by the negligence of the defendant in the viola-

tion of some duty owing to the plaintiff *** together with the plaintiff's appreciation of the
danger to be encountered and his voluntary exposure of himself to it."

Obviously, if there is sufficient evidence to submit
the question of contributory negligence to a jury, the
court should not find as a matter of law that the plaintiff had assumed the risk which involves a greater degree
elf knowledge, an intelligent choice, and a voluntary
subjection to the risk.
Another interesting and pertinent decision on the

same point is Schance v. H. 0. Adams Tile Company,
280 P.2d 851, decided by the Third District Court of
Appeals in 1955. The court said at page 854,

"Knowledge the danger exists is not knowledge of the amount of danger necessary to charge
a person with negligence in assuming the risk
caused by such danger. The doing of an act with
appreciation of the amount of danger in addition
to mere appreciation of the danger is necessary
in order to say as a matter of law that a person is
negligent."
In his brief in support of his motion for summary
judgment the defendant has cited other cases in which
the court did not submit the matter to the jury on finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but
here again, the court obviously listened to the testimony
before making its determination. The court should at
least do the same in the Corbridge case.

13

The defendant has in his brief in support f .
.
0 1ll1
motion for summary Judgment relied heavily upon
Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d 4.13. Tl
essence of the decision in the case was that a li'ti' gantle
had not been deprived of his constitutional rights to ,
•
•
d
Jury tnal when after the plaintiff had presented his evidence the court granted defendant's motion to dism·IS\
the action because the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. It is important to note that j11
the Wold case the court heard all of the testimony and
had an opportunity to pass judgment on the reasonable.
ness of the plaintiff's conduct. The plaintiffs do not
argue with the court's position in the Wold case. After
the court has heard the evidence, if it determines that
there is not basis upon which the matter can be submitted to the jury, certainly the court is entitled to grant
defendant's motion to dismiss at that time, however.
this does not mean nor should it be construed to mean '
that a court should grant a motion for summary judg
ment before the facts are heard either by the court or a
jury simply upon defendant's motion for summar)'
judgment.
.

In the Wold case the court found that a reasonably
prudent person would not expose himself to a known
danger, when there is an ewy, known and convenient
route around it. The court necessarily had to hear evi·
dence to first ascertain that there was an easy known
and convenient route around it. There is no such evidence before the court at the present time and the court
cannot speculate as to the extent of the danger and what
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the plaintiff either knew or should have known absent
testimony relative to these matters.
Furthermore, the Wold case can be clearly distinguished from the Corbridge case. In the Wold situation
the plaintiffs were well aware of the nature of the excavation in front of their home, they were present when
the excavation was made, they knew it was there, they
knew the extent of the construction and likewise they
were familiar with their neighborhood and knew how
far and in what direction they would have to go around
or the skirt the dangerous condition. No such situation
txisted in the Corbridge case. The plaintiff, Mrs. Corbridge, simply knew by virtue of the fact that there were
detour signs, that there was some construction taking
place in that vicinity. (Dep. p. 7) She did not know
and had no reason to know there was an excavation and
she had no way of knowing which alternative route she
might take to avoid or to lessen the dangerous situation
in which she found herself. She was forced to make
a choice of alternative routes in which to travel and
she knew not the number of alternatives or the risk involved in any or all of them.
It is also significant that the court said in Wold
v. Ogden City, at page 455,

·'This court is charged with the duty of protecting all of the rights of all litigants."
To grant a motion for summary judgment without
first having heard the evidence is not protecting the
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rights of any of the litigants. The court conti'n d
ue 'lt
page 456,
'
"Plaintiff's conduct, aside from the conce t .
. of ris
.k
th e assumption
, was unreasonable i p '-]lJl
light of. this known hazard and the existencen oL.1ae
1
convement, hardly burdensome detour at tli ·
.
f
e intersection o Grant and 18th ~treet, where tht
tr~nch ended and thr~u~h. wluch plaintiff had
driven shortly before his InJU~Y· To deliberately
attempt to cross under such circumstances seen~
to be that kind of lack of due care not attributable to the ordinary prudent person exercising
care for his own safety."
The significant factors in this court's finding, however, are a known hazard, the existence of a convenient.
hardly burdensome detour, and that the plaintiff had
driven on it shortly before his injury. These are all
facts that were known in the Wold situation, but unknown in the Corbridge case. As such, the Wold decision
should certainly not be controlling here.
POINT V
A PERSON CONFRONTED WITH AN
EMERGENCY SHOULD NOT BE HELD TO
THE SAME STANDARD OF CARE AS UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
Plaintiffs do not contend that the plaintiff Dorlene
Corbridge faced an emergency where she was obligated
to act instantaneously without giving some thought to
her course of conduct. However, she was certainly faced
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with a situation which would give rise to anxiety, a certain amount of fear, and great concern for herself and
her children, particularly in view of the fact that she
had to leave her children on a public highway late at
night in the dark, without supervision or protection. It
is obvious that this was necessary if she was to secure
help in getting her automobile functioning again so that
she could return with her children to their home. She
necessarily had to pull her automobile off the traveled
portion of the highway, place it in an area where it
would be somewhat protected and then proceed herself
to get help.
This principle stated above is well established in
Utah. See Schlatter v. McCarthy, et al., 113 Utah 543,
196 P.2d 968 (1948), at page 971,
"It is a well settled rule that a person confronted with a sudden emergency who chooses
a course of conduct to avoid the danger such as a
person of ordinary prudence might make under
similar circumstances, is not guilty of contributory negligence, even though it subsequently
appears that another course of action might have
avoided or ameliorated the injury."

17

CONCLUSION

The appellant respectfully urges that the d · ·
ec1s1 011
of the lower court be reversed and the matter rein tl
.
. .
an ed
for trial. To do otherwise is to ignore the plaintiff'
affidavit and her deposition in which it is clearly o\i '
01111
that she was unaware of the excavation, that it was dark
and the excavation could not be seen by her, that tht' ·
alternate route over the detour road was dangerous
and to further deprive her of her day in court without
having first been given an opportunity to produce eiidence relative to the physical nature of the constructioit
site. Neither the Lower Court nor this Court knows the
exact nature of the construction area and the Yariou,
perils or alternatives available to the plaintiff at the time
of her injury. And taking the facts as she states them
to be, her actions were not unreasonable and did 1wr
deviate from the standard expected of the ordinm ,
reasonable person under the circumstances.
•J

Her experience in the general vicinity of the construction site was very limited having passed through
it only once within the last six months she could not
reasonably be expected to know the exact nature of the
construction. Absent any lighting devices, barriers, or
barricades, and having felt nothing unusual about the
roadway as she walked toward her benefactor's car, haY·
ing seen no other equipment, cement forms, or materials '
of any kind, we cannot say as a matter of law that her
actions were unreasonable and deprive her of an oppor·
tunity to prove her case. The authorities cited by the
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defendant and respondent are not applicable to this
case and should not be controlling. On the basis of the
authorities cited by the plaintiff and appellant the decision of the Lower Court ought to be reversed and the
plaintiff given an opportunity to present her case to
11

jury.
Respectfully submitted,
FROERER, HOROWITZ, PARKER,
RICHARDS, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellants
200 Kiesel Building, Ogden, Utah
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